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Autonomy and End-of-Life Decision Making:
Reflections of a Lawyer and a Daughter
RAY D. MADOFFt
INTRODUCTION

What is the role of autonomy in end-of-life decision
making? As a law professor specializing in this field I
thought I knew the answer. As a family member facing endof-life decisions of a loved one, I learned firsthand of the
gulf between law and life.
THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

As a law professor, I spend much of my time educating
future lawyers about the law's approach to end-of-life
decision making. This issue basically arises at two different
times: (1) at the planning stage, when an individual is
healthy and competent and in a position to state his wishes,
and (2) when a person is in a compromised state, such that
he cannot make or express wishes for himself, but health
care decisions must be made. Although these situations are
vastly different, the operating model is the same. In both
situations, the law is concerned with maintaining the
autonomy of the individual. The question of how one
accommodates the needs of the family is ignored as the
family's preference is largely irrelevant within this legal
model.'

t Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., 1980 Brown University,
J.D., 1984 and LL.M. in Taxation, 1986 New York University School of Law.
The author thanks Mike Cassidy, Avi Soifer, and Sharon Beckman for their
helpful comments. © Copyright 2005 by Ray D. Madoff.
1. See Susan Adler Channick, The Myth of Autonomy at the End-of-Life:
Questioning the Paradigmof Rights, 44 VILL. L. REV. 577, 581 (1999) ("In death
and dying jurisprudence, the centerpiece of rights talk is personal autonomy-
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In preparing future lawyers who are going to be
involved in estate planning, I teach them the importance of
advising clients to make their wishes known regarding endof-life care. I also teach them about drafting the legal
documents that reflect those wishes: the health care proxy
and the living will (sometimes these documents are referred
to under the generic term "advance directives"). Although
these documents operate in different ways, they both
attempt to provide an opportunity for the person's wishes to
be taken into account in the event that he becomes unable
to express his own wishes.
The health care proxy is a document that allows a
person to appoint another individual as an agent to make
decisions regarding health care if the principal is unable to
make such decisions or unable to communicate decisions to
health care providers. The theory underlying the health
care proxy is that of substituted judgment; the agent's role
is to convey the end-of-life decision that the principal
himself would have made if able to do so. 2 In doing so, the
health care proxy uses the autonomy model to reflect the
patient's wishes and does not provide any mechanism to
reflect the perspectives of family3 members-even if a family
member is named as the agent.
A living will is the other commonly used document in
planning for end-of-life decision making. Like the health
care proxy, the living will strives to provide an opportunity
for input by the individual. However, rather than relying on
an agent, the living will is a document that provides specific
instructions for medical care. 4 A living will contains
instructions directly from the principal to the health care
providers. Therefore, in theory, the instructions are
effective even if the family members disagree with the
decision.

the almost unassailable right of an individual to make medical treatment
decisions even when such decisions result in the accelerated death of the
actor.").
2. See RAY D. MADOFF, CORNELIA R. TENNEY & MARTIN A. HALL, PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 57 (2001).

3. See Channick, supra note 1, at 637-38 ("[D]espite the relationship of patients
with their families, the culture of death and dying has conspired to exclude the
family from one of life's most intimate moments.").
4. See MADOFF, TENNEY & HALL, supra note 2, at 56.
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Even from this clear-cut lawyers' perspective, I try to
impart to my students awareness of some of the practical
limitations of this model. After all, drafting a living will
requires imagining situations that, to most people, are
simply beyond imagination. To illustrate this problem, I
show my students an episode from the popular television
show Seinfeld. In this episode one of the characters,
Kramer, having watched a movie about a woman in a coma,
decides he needs a living will. Kramer asks his friend
Elaine to be his designated agent for health care decisions
and together they consult an attorney to draft the
appropriate documents. To prepare the living will, the
attorney describes scenarios and asks Kramer what type of
medical care he would like for each. The following colloquy
captures the flavor of the meeting:
ATTORNEY. Situation number four. You're breathing on
your own, you're conscious but with no muscular
function.
KRAMER. Well, would I be able to communicate?
ATTORNEY. I don't see how.
ELAINE. I don't like the sound of this one.
KRAMER. Huhh, yeah, let's pull the cord.
open a soda can) you're
ELAINE. Yank it like (pops
5
starting a lawnmower.
Even if this is written broadly for the sake of humor, as
is often the case, the humor contains a good deal of truth.
Although people regularly prepare living wills that state
their wishes in the event of various circumstances, it is very
difficult to imagine those situations and to predict how one
is going to feel. One of the limitations of the living will is
that it presumes that people, when they are young and
healthy, are going to be able to accurately assess how they
would feel in the face of serious and debilitating illness.
And the truth is . . .we don't really know whether people
actually feel the way they imagine they will. Indeed, the
bulk of the evidence points in the other direction. It is not
uncommon for people to say things like: "if I were paralyzed
(or blind or suffered a stroke or any number of other
debilitating conditions that humans face), I would not want
5. Script of Seinfeld: The Comeback (NBC television broadcast Jan. 30, 1997),
http://www.seinology.com/scripts/script-147.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
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to go on living." Yet, when people actually face these
situations, their attitude is typically very different. The will
to live is so strong, that although they may at first be
discouraged about their situation, most people continue to
find meaning in their lives, even if they didn't think they
could.
That is how the legal world addresses advance decision
making, but what about the situation where there is no
explicit advanced directive, but a decision about medical
intervention must be made? The legal model again focuses
on the individual. If he is competent to make the decision,
then he should do so. This makes perfect sense because
medical intervention in the absence of consent is a battery,
an unauthorized assault on someone's body. Therefore, it is
natural to first look for consent. Yet, understanding consent
in the context of "live" end-of-life decision making can be far
more complicated than it initially appears.
One of the most well known cases to address this
situation involved a young woman, Karen Ann Quinlan,
who collapsed at a party after swallowing alcohol and
tranquilizers. Doctors saved her life, but she suffered brain
damage and lapsed into a persistent vegetative state. Her
family sought to remove her from life support machinery,
but the doctors objected. The question eventually went
before the New Jersey Supreme Court, which recognized
the right of a person in a persistent vegetative state to be
taken off of life support machinery if that is her wish. As
the court stated:
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if Karen
were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the
existing prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return)
and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively
apparatus, even
decide upon the discontinuance of the life-support
6
if it meant the prospect of natural death.

Although this decision makes perfect sense in the
abstract, if one imagines such a situation actually
happening, some of the difficulties of this model become

6. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976). For a discussion of the case
law in this area, see Charles H. Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging
Substantive Standards and ProceduralProtectionsfor Medical Decision Making
within the American Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1983).
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readily apparent. Let's imagine that Karen Ann Quinlan
were to miraculously become able to express her wishes and
she wakes and says "Oh my G-d, this is awful, pull the
plug!" There would still be questions as to whether this
reflected her well thought-out decision or whether the
comment reflected initial depression at her circumstances.
Do you treat the depression? How do you know when you
have a decision that truly reflects that person's wishes? It is
notable that even the fantasy of sudden lucidity still raises
problems for end-of-life decision making.
And, of course, most people don't have such moments of
lucidity. Far more common is the situation where patients
are not able to express their wishes and indeed may not
even be competent to form their decision, and you have the
family and medical personnel and decisions that must be
made. The real life situations are significantly more
complicated than the legal construct imagines.
A DAUGHTER'S PERSPECTIVE

This was all brought home to me in a very personal way
when my father took sick several years ago and we faced
these difficult decisions.
My father was a doctor, a cardio-thoracic surgeon who
was well acquainted with the problems that people face at
the end-of-life. One thing that he knew was that he did not
want anything to do with it. So he did what he could to
make his wishes known. Massachusetts is one of the few
states that does not explicitly recognize living wills.
Nonetheless, my father carefully wrote a note that he kept
in his desk drawer that said: "If anything should happen to
me, I do not want any extraordinary measures taken." So,
one thing we had in determining his wishes was the gold
standard document, a statement written when he was
healthy that explicitly stated his wishes. My father was not
taking any chances, so in addition to this note, he also
designated a health care proxy. Here too, his wishes came
through loud and clear. A spouse is a common choice for
people in naming a health care proxy, and my mother, his
wife of almost fifty years, might have seemed a natural
choice. Nonetheless, my father, most likely mindful of my
mother's soft heart and her notoriously anti-death stance,
eschewed the obvious choice in favor of my brotheranother surgeon who was capable of making the hard
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decisions. Although this decision on its own was worth a
thousand words, my father also added a few of his own. In a
conversation with my brother, my father said: "I have
named you my health care proxy and I don't want any
monkey business!" My brother knew just what he meant.
So one thing we knew when facing these decisions was
what my father's wishes were-at least his wishes when he
was healthy. But, by the time we were facing these very
difficult decisions, many things had changed in my father's
life.
My father was an extremely active and vibrant person
through his early eighties. At the age of eighty-three he was
still practicing cardio-thoracic surgery with a roster of over
fifty patients (the fact that so many people would trust
their lives to an octogenarian surgeon was a testament to
his caring nature as well as his knowledge and skill). In
addition, he was taking courses at Harvard Extension
School and was in the public library researching Spinoza on
the day that he suffered a massive stroke.
Strokes can be mild or they can wreak havoc. My father
was one of the unlucky ones. Like many victims, my father's
stroke left him essentially paralyzed on his right sideunable to walk or use his right hand. More cruelly, it
robbed him of his ability to speak. He could start a
sentence, but couldn't finish it, and as much as we tried to
understand him, the ultimate effect was to isolate him from
friends and family. The stroke caused other, less common,
afflictions as well. My father had been a lifetime lover of
jazz music, but the stroke affected his ability to understand
the notes. It just sounded like noise to him. He was even
robbed of the basic pleasures of eating because he lost his
ability to taste most foods. His condition was reminiscent of
the trials of Job.
My father's life continued this way for the next three
years. During that time, although he was often profoundly
depressed, at other times he seemed to make do. He enjoyed
going for rides with my mother, watching his
grandchildren, and even the occasional ice cream cone. It
seemed like a new normal had been established.
Of course, all things change and even new normals
eventually become things of the past. About three years
after his initial stroke, my father began suffering a variety
of life-threatening ailments. At one point, he developed an
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infection and his temperature dropped to eighty-six degrees
Fahrenheit. At another point he started aspirating food and
developed a form of chronic pneumonia. And at each time,
we needed to make decisions about what course of action to
take. It was during this period that I became most
intimately aware of the difficulty of these decisions and the
limited assistance provided by the legal view of the world.
We had my father's statement of his wishes, but were
they still applicable? Although they might have provided
guidance for his views when he was healthy, were those
still his views? Of course, if we didn't follow those wishes,
how should we decide? Here again, there were a variety of
views. My mother and sister were against death at all costs.
As my mother said, "This is his only life. Who are we to
take that away from him?" My brother and older sister
looked at the situation from an objective standpoint-was
this kind of life really worth living? I wanted to use the
autonomy model, but had a hard time applying it to the
situation. On one hand, my father had clearly expressed his
wishes years before; on the other hand, after having his
stroke he continued to take his medicine and take other life
affirming actions. All of this suggests that even when
everything happens just as it is supposed to in our legal
system, this does not mean that the answers are clear.
Perhaps most surprising was the approach of medical
professionals to these health care decisions. Although they
were aware of my father's health care proxy naming my
brother as his agent for the purposes of making health care
decisions, and my father's letter expressing his wishes to
avoid extraordinary measures, they nonetheless worked
with the entire family to come to a group decision about the
appropriate treatments. They used these legal documents,
not as answers in and of themselves, but rather as tools to
move the family towards consensus about what was in my
father's best interest.
In the end, my father had one of those "moments of
lucidity" that allowed the autonomy model to work. It had
become clear, that if my father's life were to continue, he
would need to have a feeding tube. We agonized over the
decision and talked for hours on end about what to do.
Eventually, I spoke with my father and told him about the
doctor's suggested course of action. "No! No! No! No!" he
told me, making his wishes known in no uncertain terms. I
said, "you know, if they don't put in a feeding tube, you will
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die." He mustered all of his strength to say, "I know. I don't
care." And when I told him I understood what he wanted he
turned to me and said "I'm sorry."
My father died at home two weeks later. Although I will
always miss him, I feel fortunate in the comfort of feeling
we made the right decision. For those families that are not
so fortunate as to have a clear statement of their loved one's
current wishes, the experience with my father has caused
me to question, not necessarily the appropriateness of the
autonomy model, but the helpfulness of the model. As much
as one might want to take into account the true wishes of
the patient, in many situations the patient's true wish is
probably anybody's guess.
UNDERSTANDING THE GULF

This essay has discussed the vast gulf between the legal
perspective and the perspective of a family member in
facing end-of-life decisions. The former uses a strict
autonomy model, the latter recognizes that the issue is far
more complex. How can we understand this divide?
Legal scholars have long recognized that there is a
distinction between law on the books and law in action. 7 In
action, law on the books often acts as only one of many
factors in decision making. A posted speed limit is
interpreted by many drivers as a guide rather than a hard
and fast rule of driving. The allocation of liability between
persons from law on the books is taken as a factor among
others (e.g., whether the plaintiff has the resources to take
her case to court or whether the defendant has sufficient
assets to pay a liability) to be considered by parties in
negotiating a settlement to a dispute. Similarly, in end-oflife decision making, the law on the books model of patient
autonomy acts as a factor, among others, in the messy,
complicated law in action of end-of-life decision making.
When making decisions about end-of-life care, medical
professionals work with families and loved ones to reach a
consensus. In guiding families, the directions of the patient
as expressed in the living will or choice of health care proxy
are offered up as factors to be considered in the decision. At
7. This terminology was coined by Roscoe Pound in Roscoe Pound, Law in
Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
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first glance, this approach may seem to be disregarding of
The Law (capital "T," capital "L"). However rather than
being disregarding, this approach instead reflects a more
nuanced understanding of law and what it does and does
not do. Law is not a decision making machine to be applied
in all circumstances. Indeed, although law on the books
may provide an answer, it does not necessarily provide the
best answer. Medical professionals operating on the front
lines are correct to understand this approach and
incorporate it into their actions. In addition, law on the
books serves another important function as well. It serves
as a final arbiter for hard cases where consensus cannot be
reached. Although this system may have its flaws, like
democracy, it may just have fewer flaws than the
alternatives.

